suggested organizing a workers' demonstration under the auspices of the Soviet. The demonstration was planned as a farewell party by the Petrograd workers for the Socialist delegation about to go abroad to prepare for the international peace conference. Chkheidze was skeptical about this plan and I violently opposed it, arguing that the masses of workers in the capital either knew nothing about our delegation or believed what the Communists had told them. Besides, the Bolsheviks had made all their preparations for a demonstration, while the majority of the Executive Committee had not had time even to get flags and placards ready.

My objections were overruled. The demonstration took place on July 1. It was a complete fiasco. The Bolshevist banners outnumbered ours by about a hundred to one. The crowds marching in front of the Congress either ignored the Socialist delegation that was to go abroad or jeered at it.

The Communists felt this was their day—compensation for their defeat on June 23. The Anarchists decided this was their day, too. They marched from the Durnovo *dacha* in a column under a black banner. A huge crowd joined them, perhaps out of curiosity. From the Parade Plaza, they proceeded to the Crosses. A group of two or three hundred men broke into the prison, overpowered the guards, and freed a score of inmates—common criminals and a few persons held in custody on charges of espionage. The crowd took them triumphantly to the stronghold of anarchy on the Viborg Prospect.

## THE OFFENSIVE ON THE FRONT

Unrest in Petrograd distracted public attention from developments at the front.

On March 21, soon after the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the British and French armies had launched a general offensive, but they were unable to break through the German field fortifications. German submarines were gnawing at the lifelines of the British Empire. The tide had turned against the Allies, and in their distress they asked Russia to support them by an offensive, as the Russian High Command had promised under the Tsar.

The first Provisional Government was too weak to consider active military operations, but the reorganized Cabinet considered the possibility of breaking the lull on the front. The question was put to the High Command in Mogilev. The consensus of the military experts was that the army was in poor shape morally but was better provided with munitions than at any time since the beginning of the war. It seemed defensible to take a chance. The Coalition Government there-